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7
HEALTH CARE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
LAW, REGULATION, AND POLICY
Douglas McNair, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; and
W. Nicholson Price II, University of Michigan Law School
INTRODUCTION
As discussed in previous chapters, artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to
be involved in almost all aspects of the health care industry.The legal landscape for
health care AI is complex; AI systems with different intended uses, audiences, and
use environments face different requirements at state, federal, and international
levels. A full accounting of these legal requirements, or of the policy questions
involved, is far beyond the scope of this chapter. Additionally, the legal and
regulatory framework for AI in health care continues to evolve, given the nascent
stage of the industry.
In this chapter, we offer an overview of the landscape through early April 2019
and undertake three tasks. First, we lay out a broad overview of laws applicable
to different forms of health care AI, including federal statutes, federal regulations,
and state tort law liability. Second, we address in considerable depth the regulatory
requirements imposed on AI systems that help inform or make decisions about
individual patients, such as diagnosis or treatment recommendations; these systems
are referred to in this report as clinical AI. Clinical AI faces the closest scrutiny,
especially by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and by other regulatory
agencies internationally. These systems must demonstrate safety and efficacy. They
may also generate liability under state tort law, which performs its own regulatory
role and is intimately tied to the way FDA oversees clinical AI systems. Third, we
note the legal and policy issues around privacy and patient data that affect clinical
AI as well as other health care AI systems. Throughout the chapter, we highlight
key challenges, opportunities, and gaps in the current framework. The chapter
concludes with key considerations for addressing some of these issues.
197
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OVERVIEW OF HEALTH CARE AI LAWS AND
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Developers and users of health care AI systems may encounter many different
legal regimes, including federal statutes, federal regulations, and state tort law.
Below are a few of the most significant among these laws and regulations:
• Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA): FDA enforces the
FDCA, which regulates the safety and effectiveness of drugs and medical
devices, including certain forms of medical software (21 U.S.C. §§ 301 ff.).
The bulk of this chapter describes the application of the FDCA to health care
clinical AI systems.
• Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): In
addition to the Privacy Rule (described in more detail below), HIPAA authorizes
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to enforce the Security
Rule (45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164). These rules create privacy and security
requirements for certain health information.The HIPAA Breach Notification
Rule also requires certain entities to provide notifications of health
information breaches (45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–164.414). To the extent that the
development or use of health care AI systems involves health information
covered by HIPAA, those requirements may apply to developers or users of
such systems.
• Common Rule: The Common Rule sets requirements for research on
human subjects that either is federally funded or, in many instances, takes
place at institutions that receive any federal research funding (45 C.F.R.
Part 46).Among other things, most human subjects research must be reviewed
by an institutional review board (45 C.F.R. § 46.109). These requirements
can apply to AI used for research or the research used to create health care
AI. The Common Rule is enforced by the Office for Human Research
Protections.
• Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA): The FTCA prohibits deceptive
and unfair trade practices affecting interstate commerce (15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
These could include acts relating to false and misleading health claims,
representations regarding a piece of software’s performance, or claims affecting
consumer privacy and data security. Health care AI products may raise any
of these types of claims. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the
requirements of the FTCA.
• FTC Health Breach Notification Rule: This FTC rule, separate from
HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule, requires certain businesses to provide
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notifications to consumers after a breach of personal health record information,
including information that may be collected to train, validate, or use health
care AI systems (16 C.F.R. Part 318). The FTC enforces this rule.
• State tort law: When one individual or entity injures another, tort law may
allow the injured individual to recover damages. Injury could result from the
use of health care AI systems, including when the behavior of developers,
providers, hospitals, or other health care actors falls below the standard of care.
State law determines the applicable standard of care and when tort liability
will exist.
We summarize each of these categories of regulatory and legal oversight by
application in Table 7-1, referencing the applicable laws and regulations for
different types of AI systems. Liability refers to the legal imposition of responsibility
for injury through the state tort law system.
TABLE 7-1 | Typical Applicability of Various Laws and Regulations to U.S. Health Care

Artificial Intelligence Systems
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SAFET Y AND EFFICACY OF CLINICAL SYSTEMS
A key set of laws work to ensure the safety and efficacy of medical technology,
including clinical AI systems. The principal requirements are determined by the
FDCA and enforced by FDA. State tort law also plays a role in ensuring quality
by managing liability for injuries, including those that may arise from insufficient
care in developing or using clinical AI.
The raison d’être of clinical AI systems is to be coupled with and to inform
human decision making that bears upon the content and conduct of clinical
care, including preventive care, to promote favorable, equitable, and inclusive
clinical outcomes and/or mitigate risks or interdict adverse events or nonoptimal
outcomes. Regulatory authorities in various countries, including FDA, expect
the pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology industries to conduct
their development of all diagnostics and therapeutics (including companion
and complementary diagnostics and therapeutics) toward the goal of safer, more
efficacious, and personalized medicine.This development should result in care that
is, at a minimum, not inferior to conventional (non-AI-based) standard-of-care
outcomes and safety endpoints. Health services are expected to fund such
AI-coupled diagnostics and therapeutics, and prescribers and patients are, over
time, likely to adopt and accept them. Increased development of “coupled”
products (including clinical AI systems) could result in “safer and improved
clinical and cost-effective use of medicines, more efficient patient selection for
clinical trials, more cost-effective treatment pathways for health services,” and a
less risky, more profitable development process for therapeutics and diagnostics
developers (Singer and Watkins, 2012).
The right level of regulation requires striking a delicate balance. While the
over-regulation or over-legislation of AI-based personalized medical apps may
delay the translation of machine learning findings to meaningful, widespread
deployment, appropriate regulatory oversight is necessary to ensure adoption, trust,
quality, safety, equitable inclusivity, and effectiveness. Regulatory oversight is also
needed to minimize false-negative and false-positive errors and misinterpretation
of clinical AI algorithms’ outputs, actions, and recommendations to clinicians.
Recent examination of the ethics of genome-wide association studies for
multifactorial diseases found three criteria necessary for identification of genes
to be useful: (1) the data in the studies and work products derived from them
must be reproducible and applicable to the target population; (2) the data and the
derived work products should have significant usefulness and potential beneficial
impact to the patients to whom they are applied; and (3) the resulting knowledge
should lead to measurable utility for the patient and outweigh associated risks or
potential harms (Jordan and Tsai, 2010). Thus, regulatory standards for clinical
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AI tools should at least extend to accuracy and relevancy of data inputs and model
outputs, marketing of AI systems for specific clinical indications, and transparency
or auditability of clinical AI performance.

Medical Device Regulation
Some AI systems, particularly those algorithms that will perform or assist with
clinical tasks related to diagnosis, interpretation, or treatment, may be classified
as medical devices and fall under applicable FDA regulations. Other AI systems
may instead be classified as “services” or as “products,” but not medical devices
(see Box 7-1). FDA’s traditional regulatory processes for medical devices include
establishment registration and listing plus premarket submissions for review and
approval or clearance by FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health Office
of Device Evaluation or Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health.
In the United States, the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (P.L. 94-295)
to the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 360c) established a risk-based framework for the
regulation of medical devices.The law established a three-tiered risk classification
system based on the risk posed to patients should the device fail to perform
as intended. The FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 360j) definition of a medical device is
summarized in Box 7-1.

BOX 7-1
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 360j)
Medical Device Definition
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent,
or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is:
[One from the following]
Recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia,
or any supplement to them OR intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or
other animals OR intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals AND which does not
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body
of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes.
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The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act, P.L. 114-255) was signed into law on
December 13, 2016. The significant portion with regard to clinical AI systems is
Section 3060 (“Regulation of Medical and Certain Decisions Support Software”),
which amends Section 520 of the FDCA so as to provide five important
exclusions from the definition of a regulatable medical device. Under Section
3060 of the Act, clinical decision support (CDS) software is nominally exempted
from regulation by FDA—that is, it is defined as not a medical device—if it is
intended for the purpose of:
(i)	displaying, analyzing, or printing medical information about a patient or
other medical information (such as peer-reviewed clinical studies and
clinical practice guidelines);
(ii)	supporting or providing recommendations to a health care professional
about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition; and
(iii)	enabling such health care professional to independently review the basis
for such recommendations that such software presents so that it is not
the intent that such health care professional rely primarily on any of
such recommendations to make a clinical diagnosis or treatment decision
regarding an individual patient.
This exemption does not apply to software that is “intended to acquire, process,
or analyze a medical image or a signal from an in vitro diagnostic device or a
pattern or signal from a signal acquisition system” (21st Century Cures Act § 3060).
FDA has stated that it would use enforcement discretion to not enforce compliance
with medical device regulatory controls for medical device data systems, medical
image storage devices, and medical image communications devices (FDA, 2017a).
The 21st Century Cures Act codifies some of FDA’s prior posture of restraint
from enforcement.
Under this system, devices that pose greater risks to patients are subject to more
regulatory controls and requirements. Specifically, general controls are sufficient
to provide reasonable assurance of a Class I device’s safety and effectiveness, while
special controls are utilized for Class II devices for which general controls alone
are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of device safety and effectiveness
(21 C.F.R. § 860.3). FDA classifies Class III devices as ones intended to be used in
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use that is of substantial importance
in preventing the impairment of human health, or that may present a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and for which insufficient information exists
to determine whether general controls or special controls are sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of a device (21 C.F.R. § 860.3).
This highest risk class of devices is subject to premarket approval to demonstrate a
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reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Even for this highest risk class of
devices, the evidence FDA requires for premarket approval has long been flexible,
varying according to the characteristics of the device, its conditions of use, the
existence and adequacy of warnings and other restrictions, and other factors.
There is generally more flexibility in the amount of clinical evidence needed for
medical devices than for drugs and biological products, because they are subject
to different statutory criteria and the mechanism of action and modes of failure
are generally more predictable and better characterized for devices than for drugs
and biological products.
Additionally, the design process for a medical device is more often an iterative
process based largely on rational design and non-clinical testing rather than clinical
studies. However, this last aspect is not, in general, true for clinical AI systems.The
machine learning process is itself a kind of observational research study. In some
cases—particularly for medium- and high-risk clinical AIs—the design process
may depend on lessons learned as such tools are deployed or on intermediate
results that inform ways to improve efficacy (FDA, 2019b).The Clinical Decision
Support Coalition and other organizations have recently opined that many types
of clinical AI tools should not be regulated or that the industry should instead
self-regulate in all application areas that FDA chooses not to enforce on the basis
of their review of risks to the public health. Notably, the principles and riskbased classification processes have recently been updated to address requirements
for software as a medical device (SaMD) products (see FDA, 2017c § 6.0, p. 11;
IMDRF, N12 § 5.1).
It is worth noting the distinction between CDS software tools, including clinical
AIs, that replace the health professional’s role in making a determination for
the patient (i.e., automation) and those that simply provide information to the
professional, who can then take it into account and independently evaluate it (i.e.,
assistance).The former may be deemed by FDA to be a medical device and subject
to medical device regulations. Under the 21st Century Cures Act, if a CDS product
has multiple functions, where one is excluded from the definition of a medical
device and another is not, FDA can assess the safety and effectiveness to determine
whether the product should be considered a medical device (21st Century Cures
Act § 3060). Also, FDA can still regulate the product as a medical device if it
finds that the software “would be reasonably likely to have serious adverse health
consequences” or meets the criteria for a Class III medical device. Clinical AI
systems that are deemed to be medical devices will generally require either De
Novo or premarket approval submissions (FDA, 2018a). In some instances, where a
valid pre-1976 predicate exists, a traditional 510(k) submission may be appropriate.
Note, too, that the 21st Century Cures Act’s statutory language, while already
in force, is subject to implementing regulations to be developed by FDA over
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time and leaves considerable ambiguity that subjects developers of clinical AI
systems to FDA enforcement discretion. For example, uncertainty remains when
software is being used in “supporting or providing recommendations,” or when
it “enables a health care professional to independently review the basis for [its]
recommendations.” FDA has issued some draft guidance (FDA, 2017b), and more
guidance will undoubtedly be forthcoming. But ambiguity will likely be present
nonetheless, as will the possibility of enforcement discretion.
Oversight of safety and effectiveness does not just come from regulators,
whether domestic or international. In particular, diagnostic testing that is provided
by laboratories and other enterprises as services is subject to oversight provided
by the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Act of 1988 (CLIA, P.L. 100-578) and
the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-41). Certain
clinical AI tools that are services rather than products may be appropriate to
regulate under CLIA. It is possible that some clinical AIs—especially ones that
have aspects similar to diagnostics classified as laboratory-developed tests (LDTs),
developed and performed in university-based health facilities or other provider
organizations—may be deployed strictly as services for patients in the care of
those institutions and not marketed commercially.

FDA’s Digital Health Initiative
FDA has expressed interest in actively promoting innovation in the digital
health space. FDA’s proposed Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert)
Program aims to (1) substantially reduce regulatory burdens for most suppliers
and operators of clinical AI systems and (2) improve the health system’s rates of
responsiveness to emerging unmet health needs, including personalized medicine
(FDA, 2018c).
The 21st Century Cures Act and FDA documents reflect an increasing realization
that data from real-world operations are necessary for oversight. Health care
information technology (IT) systems are so complex and the conditions under
which clinical AI systems will operate so diverse that development, validation,
and postmarket surveillance must depend on utilizing real-world data and not
just clinical trials data or static, curated repositories of historical data. “Realworld data (RWD) are data relating to patient health status and/or the delivery
of health care routinely collected from a variety of sources,” including electronic
health record (EHR) systems (FDA, 2019c). “Real-world evidence (RWE) is the
clinical evidence regarding the usage, and potential benefits or risks, of a medical
product derived from analysis of RWD” (FDA, 2019c). All of these are subject
to applicable HIPAA and other privacy protections such that RWD and RWE
must be rigorously de-identified (El Emam, 2013) prior to use for the secondary
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purposes of clinical AI development and productization. RWE and RWD are
discussed in greater detail below.
The goal of FDA’s Pre-Cert Program (FDA, 2019a) is to establish voluntary,
tailored, pragmatic, and least-burdensome regulatory oversight to assess software
developer organizations of all sizes.The Pre-Cert Program simultaneously aims to
establish trust that developers have adequate quality management system (QMS)
processes in place and a culture of quality and organizational excellence such that
those developers can develop and maintain safe, effective, high-quality SaMD
products. The Pre-Cert Program leverages the transparency of organizational
QMS compliance and product safety as well as quality metrics across the entire
life cycle of SaMD. It uses a streamlined premarket review process and leverages
postmarket monitoring to verify the continued safety, effectiveness, and quality
performance of SaMD in the real world. The premarket review for a precertified
organization’s SaMD product is informed by the organization’s precertification
status, precertification level, and the SaMD’s risk category. With this program,
FDA envisions leveraging the risk-category framework for SaMD developed
by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to inform
the risk category (FDA, 2017c, 2019b). The IMDRF framework describes the
spectrum of software functions, some of which may not meet the definition of a
device in Section 201(h) of the FDCA and others that may meet the definition
of a device, but for which FDA has expressed that it does not intend to enforce
compliance. For the purposes of the Pre-Cert Program, the application of
FDA’s long-established risk category framework would remain consistent with
the current definition of device under Section 201(h) of the FDCA and FDA’s
current enforcement policies. The IMDRF framework establishes types and
subtypes of SaMD products based on the state of the health care condition and
the significance of the information provided by the products (IMDRF, 2014).
Most clinical AI systems are multielement “ensembles” of a plurality of
predictive models with an evidence-combining “supervisor” module that
establishes a collective answer or output from the ensemble-member models’
execution. Clinical AI involves prediction, classification, or other intelligencerelated outputs. These are generated from data supplied as inputs to the model,
from fewer than 10 to many hundreds of phenotypic input variables or—in the
case of time-series or spectrum-analytic AI systems, image-processing AI systems,
or AI systems that include genomics biomarkers—a large number of engineered
features that are derived from very high-dimensional raw data inputs. Likewise,
present-day genomics-based diagnostics typically involve dozens of input
variables, for which there are regulatory policies and procedures that have been
established for more than 10 years. These govern existing regulated diagnostics,
such as in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays (IVDMIAs) (FDA, 2007a).
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Not all clinical AI systems will manifest hazards or have risk levels comparable
to those associated with existing IVDMIA products. However, the methodology,
review, and clearance criteria that have been found effective for the regulation of
IVDMIAs may form a useful point of reference for the regulatory practice for
clinical AI systems.

Clinical AI Systems That May Merit Different
Regulator y Approaches
FDA has indicated that it will apply a risk-based assessment framework, where
the risk level of different clinical AI systems will be influenced by the different
types of on-label clinical indications and contexts in which they are intended to
be used, plus the different situations in which their off-label usage might plausibly
be anticipated, adopting the IMDRF framework (FDA, 2019b; IMDRF, 2014).
For example, a clinical AI system’s intended use might be as a screening test to
determine the person’s susceptibility to, or propensity in the future to, develop
a clinical condition or disease that has not yet materialized; this affords time for
longitudinal observation, repeat testing, and vigilance to monitor signs and
symptoms of the emergence of the disease and is accordingly lower risk. Similarly,
an AI system designed to classify a condition’s stage or current severity, or to establish
the prognosis or probable clinical course and rate of progression of a condition,
functions essentially like a biomarker that characterizes risk and does so in a manner
that is amenable to multiple repeat tests and observations over a period of time.
Such situations have low time sensitivity and a plurality of opportunities
for the experienced clinicians to review, second-guess, and corroborate the
recommendations of the screening clinical AI system. In IMDRF parlance, these
are clinical AI systems that “inform” clinical management but do not “drive”
clinical management. Indeed, the “informing care” function of some present-day
clinical AI tools of this type is to automatically/reflexively order the appropriate
standard-of-care confirmatory diagnostic testing and monitoring. These clinical
AI systems provide additional evidence or advice (e.g., regarding the likelihood of
the condition screened for and/or the cost-effectiveness of pursuing a diagnostic
workup for the condition) and promote consistency, relevancy, and quality in
diagnostic workups. In general, such screening or informational clinical AI systems
will be classified as having low risk. As such, many clinical AI systems are outside
the formal scope of medical device regulation and do not require establishment
registration and listing or other regulatory filings (21st Century Cures Act § 3060).
By contrast, some classification, forecasting, and prognostic biomarker clinical
AI algorithms that instead drive clinical management and/or involve clinical
indications may be associated with a medium or high risk; the AI systems could
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contain faults that cause harm via commissive or omissive errors, either directly
or through clinicians’ actions or inaction. Perioperative, anesthesiology, critical
care, obstetrics, neonatology, and oncology use-cases are examples of medium- or
high-risk settings (Therapeutic Monitoring Systems, Inc., 2013). In such situations,
there is great time sensitivity and there may be little or no time or opportunity to
seek additional testing or perform more observations to assess the accuracy of the
AI’s recommendation or action. In some instances, such as oncology and surgery,
the decision making informed by the AI tool may lead to therapeutic actions that
are not reversible and either close other therapeutic avenues or alter the clinical
course of the illness and perhaps its responsiveness to subsequent therapy. Such
AI tools would, by Section 3060 of the 21st Century Cures Act, be formally
within the scope of medical device regulation and would require establishment
registration, listing, and other regulatory filings—De Novo, 510(k), premarket
approval, or precertification—and associated postmarket surveillance, reporting,
and compliance procedures.

Explainability and Transparency from a Regulator y Perspective
AI systems are often criticized for being black boxes (Pasquale, 2016) that are
very complex and difficult to explain (Burrell, 2016). Nevertheless, such systems
can fundamentally be validated and understood in terms of development and
performance (Kroll, 2018; Therapeutic Monitoring Systems, Inc., 2013), even if
not in terms of mechanism—and even if they do not conform to preexisting
clinician intuitions or conventional wisdom (Selbst and Barocas, 2018). Notably,
the degree of “black box” lack of explainability that may be acceptable to
regulators validating performance might differ from the amount of explainability
clinicians demand, although the latter is an open empirical question.This chapter
addresses explainability to clinicians and other nonregulators only to the extent
that it interacts with regulatory requirements. Instead, the focus is largely on
validation by regulators, which may be satisfied by some current development
processes.
While the rest of this section focuses on how explainability and transparency
may or may not be required for regulators to oversee safety and efficacy,
regulators may also require explainability for independent reasons. For instance,
regulators may require clinical AI tools to be explainable to clinicians to whose
decision making they are coupled; to quality assurance officers and IT staff
in a health provider organization who acquire the clinical AI and have riskmanagement/legal responsibility for their operation; to developers; to regulators;
or to other humans. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) right to explanation rules, for instance, enacted in 2016 and effective
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May 2018, applies to AI systems as well as humans and web services (Kaminski,
2019) and governs European Union citizens worldwide. Similar standards may
be implemented in the United States and other jurisdictions. Such standards and
regulations are important for public safety and for the benefits of clinical AI systems
to be realized through appropriate acceptance and widespread use. However, the
notion of explainability is not well defined. There is a lack of agreement about
both what constitutes an adequate explanation of clinical AI tools, and to whom
the explanation must be provided to conform to applicable right to explanation
rules and thus be suitable for regulatory approval.
Current right to explanation regulations and standards fails to acknowledge that
human data scientists, clinicians, regulators, courts, and the broader public have
limitations in recognizing and interpreting subtle patterns in high-dimensional
data. Certain types of AI systems are capable of learning—and certain AI models
are capable of intelligently and reliably acting upon—patterns that humans are
entirely and forever incapable of noticing or correctly interpreting (Seblst and
Barocas, 2019). Correspondingly, humans, unable to grasp the patterns that AI
recognizes, may be in a poor position to comprehend the explanations of AI
recommendations or actions.As noted, the term “black box” is sometimes pejorative
toward AI, especially neural networks, deep learning, and other fundamentally
opaque models. They are contrasted to logistic regression; decision-tree; and
other older-technology, static, deterministic models—all with low dimensionality
but are able to show the inputs that led to the recommendation or action, with
variables that are generally well known to the clinician and causally related.
If society, lawmakers, and regulatory agencies were to expect every clinical
AI system to provide an explanation of its actions, it could greatly limit the
capacity of clinical AI developers’ use of the best contemporary AI technologies,
which markedly outperform older AI technology but are not able to provide
explanations understandable to humans. Regulators do not currently require
human-comprehensible explanations for AI in other industries that have
potential risks of serious injury or death. For example, autonomous vehicles are
not required to provide a running explanation or commentary on their roadway
actions.
While requiring explainability may not always be compatible with maximizing
capacity and performance, different forms of transparency are available that
might enable oversight (see Figure 7-1). For instance, transparency of the
initial dataset—including provenance and data-processing procedures—helps
to demonstrate replicability. Transparency of algorithm or system architecture is
similarly important for regulatory oversight. When AI systems are transparent not
just to the regulator but more broadly, such transparency can enable independent
validation and oversight by third parties and build trust with users.
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FIGURE 7-1 | Different forms of transparency.

AI Logging and Auditing
Today, developers creating clinical AI systems with their enterprises’ riskmanagement and product liability exposures in mind are engineering and testing
their clinical AI deliverables with Agile (Jurney, 2017) or other controlled software
development life cycle (SDLC) methods. Defined, well-managed, and controlled
SDLC processes produce identifiable and auditable systems and maintain controlled
documents of the systems’ development processes under the developers’ written,
reviewed, and approved standard operating procedures. They conform to QMS
principles (see ISO-9001, ISO-13485, and 21 C.F.R. Part 820), FDA device master
record type, Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), and applicable laws
and regulations. These include design assurance, design control, hazard analysis,
and postmarket surveillance (21 C.F.R. Part 822) provisions. Such industrialstrength developers of clinical AI systems also engineer their systems such that
the systems’ operation creates (1) a persistent, archived log of each transaction or
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advisory output that each clinical AI system performs; (2) the versioning of the
AI system’s elements that performed the transaction, traceable to the data sources;
and (3) the validation and software quality-assurance testing that led to the AI
systems being authorized for production and subsequent use. These logs enable
the examination of the inputs, outputs, and other details in case of anomalies or
harms. The logs are open to the clinician-users, employers, organizations who
acquire/authorize the AI system’s deployment (e.g., health provider organizations,
health plans, or public health agencies), regulators, developers, and the courts.The
individual release-engineered and version-controlled instances of present-day
industrial-strength clinical AI systems are identifiable and rigorously auditable,
based on these SDLC controlled-document artifacts, which are maintained by
the developer organization that owns the intellectual property.
For this type of clinical AI system, the regulatory agencies’ traditional submissions
and compliance processes for SaMD are feasible and may not need substantial
alteration (e.g., FDA, 2018b). The types of evidence required by plaintiffs,
defendants, counsel, and the courts may not need substantial alteration, although
the manner of distributed storage, retrieval, and other aspects of provisioning
such evidence will change. Moreover, the availability of such evidence will not be
significantly altered by the nature of clinical AI systems, provided that developers
follow QMS and CGMPs and maintain conformity, including controlleddocument artifacts retention.
Some clinical AI tools will be developed using RWD. Because RWD are
messy in ways that affect the quality and accuracy of the resulting inferences,
as described in Chapter 6, more rigorous requirements for auditing clinical AI
systems developed and validated using RWD will need to be established.

AI Performance Surveillance and Maintenance
Several architectural and procedural aspects of machine learning–based clinical AI
systems will require significant changes in regulatory compliance and submissions,
in terms of scale and scope. In modern AI applications using dynamic data sources—
such as clinical data streams stored in EHRs, data collected via sensor-enabled
wearable devices and combined with other forms of data, and other RWD—the AI
models and algorithms are likely to experience drift over time or as the algorithms
are deployed across institutions whose catchment areas and epidemiology differ
(dataset shift, see Quiñonero-Candela et al., 2009; Subbaswamy et al., 2019).These
longitudinal drifts and shifts entail expanded design control, design assurance, and
evidentiary requirements, as discussed in Chapter 6 and below. Therefore, the
traditional approach of assessing performance using a static, limited dataset to make
assessments about the ongoing safety of a system is inadequate with regard to
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clinical AI. Continuous machine learning offers one solution for dataset shift and
drift by updating with new population-specific data (FDA, 2019b). Not all clinical
AI systems aim to do this, and very few clinical AI systems implement continuous
learning today. The goals of learning health systems and personalized medicine
do create an impetus for more continuous machine learning–based AI systems,
as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 in more detail. However, current regulatory and
jurisprudential methods and infrastructure are not prepared for this.

Natural Language Processing and Text Mining AI
Unstructured notes constitute another important source of RWD, and
appropriate standards for the extraction, parsing, and curation of unstructured
information for clinical AI systems is therefore another open area requiring
regulatory oversight. Natural language processing (NLP) algorithms and text
mining are important for certain kinds of clinical AI that use unstructured data
such as clinical impressions and other remarks, as discussed in Chapter 5.
There will be a need for retention and curation of the unstructured source-text
documents as well as the discrete labels or concept codes and values derived
by NLP from those documents. Retention of all of these is necessary because
NLP algorithms may change over time. The underlying lexical reference data
and parameters that govern the parser’s operation may likewise change from one
release to the next. Thus, release engineering regression testing and validation of
successive releases of a clinical AI model that depends on unstructured text must
be able to demonstrate that the NLP subsystem continues to meet its specifications
and delivers to the clinical AI model inputs that are substantially equivalent to
the results it delivered for the same test cases and document content in previous
releases. Furthermore, there is natural variability in how different individuals speak.
Unlike physiology, factors such as culture and training affect how individuals
describe a phenomenon. Clinical AI systems must be robust to these variations.

Clinical Decision Support Systems
Another architectural factor to consider when regulating clinical AI systems is that
traditional CDS systems have tended to be embedded in tangible medical devices
or in single-site on-premises EHR systems (Evans and Whicher, 2018).The system
configurations and dated-signed records of changes in such architectures are readily
auditable by users, regulators, and courts. By contrast, many contemporary AI systems
are deployed on cloud-based, geographically distributed, nondeterministically
parallelized, spatially arbitrary computing architectures that, at any moment, are
physically unidentifiable. To create and maintain a full log of each processor that
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contributed in some part to the execution of a multielement ensemble model AI is
possible in principle but would likely be cost-prohibitive and too cumbersome to
be practical.Therefore, the limited traceability and fundamental non-recreatability
and non-retestability of a patient’s or clinician’s specific execution of an AI system
that may have contained a fault or that produced errors or failures—untoward,
unexpected deviations from its specifications, validation testing, and hazard
analysis—may pose particular problems for regulators, courts, developers, and the
public. These nondeterministic, noncollocation aspects of contemporary cloudbased AI implementations contrast with traditional criteria for tracking product
changes (e.g., 510(k) supplements or adverse event reporting systems).

Hazard Identification, Risk Analysis, and Reporting
Recommendations for Safe Clinical AI Systems
Identifying hazards is a necessary step to support safe system design and
operations. Identifying hazardous situations requires experts to carefully and
thoroughly evaluate the system via one of several methods. Successful assurance
of public safety rests on (1) identifying and analyzing all significant possible
scenarios that could result in accidents of differing severity, and (2) devising and
documenting effective means of mitigating the scenarios’ likelihood, frequency,
and severity. Although hazard identification and quantitative risk assessment are
important, risk management also depends on qualitative or subjective judgments
(e.g., human observation, intuition, insight regarding processes and mechanisms
of causation, creativity in anticipating human actions and psychology, and domain
expertise). Each of these judgments introduces biases and chances of omissions.
Thus, hazard identification should be a structured process.
Traditional modes of risk assessment and hazard analysis (e.g., hazard and
operability study [HAZOP] or process hazard analysis [PHA]) that have been used
in regulation of medical devices for decades can also be used for clinical AI systems
(ISO, 2009, 2016). However, new hazard types related to geographic dispersity and
the dynamic, nondeterministic execution of cloud-based clinical AI systems and
machine learning mean that new risks must be evaluated and new mitigations
must be devised, tested, and documented. Clinical AI systems may exhibit emergent
properties that depend on the whole system as it evolves in time and are not specified
or statically defined by the system’s parts or subsystems (Johnson, 2002; Louis and
Nardi, 2018).This means that the safety of a clinical AI system, like an autonomous
vehicle, cannot “solely be analyzed or verified by looking at, for example, a hardware
architecture” or only one physical system instantiation (Bagschik et al., 2018). As a
result, requirements “must be derived in a top-down development process which
incorporates different views on a system at all levels” (Bagschik et al., 2018).
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Regulatory agencies should require clinical AI developers to conduct iterative
system testing on multiple physical instances of the system and with enough
iterations to provide reasonable assurance of detecting faults and hazards from many
sources. These could include (1) logic races; (2) nonbinding and nonexecution of
worker agents on cloud-based servers; (3) variable or prolonged latencies of data
ingestion of accruing clinical information on which an AI depends into noSQL
repositories; (4) nonexistent or erroneous mappings of input and output variables
utilized by the AI algorithms to do their work; (5) nonreceipt or system-mediated
rejection or nonstorage or nondisplay of the AI’s output to the relevant user(s);
and even (6) potentially automatic software updates (i.e., unsupervised updates of
clinical AI systems into “live” production environments, where they immediately
begin to affect decisions and might not undergo local review and approval first
by the user-clinicians’ IT or quality assurance staff). Such an iterative testing
requirement is consistent with FDA’s recently issued guidance on addressing
uncertainty in premarket approval decision making (FDA, 2018a).
For continuous learning and other dynamic, adaptive, and nondeterministic
aspects of clinical AI systems and the computing architectures on which they are
implemented, developers and regulators could usefully look to risk-assessment
and -management methods that have been successfully used for two decades
in the chemical process industry and other continuous-process operations such
as public utilities (Alley et al., 1998; Allocco, 2010; Baybutt, 2003; Bragatto
et al., 2007; Chung and Edwards, 1999; Frank and Whittle, 2001; Hyatt, 2003;
Nolan, 2011; Palmer, 2004; Paltrinieri and Khan, 2016; Reniers and Cozzani,
2013; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2000; Villa et al., 2016). Chemical plants, for
instance, depend on the availability of public utilities such as water, and chemical
plant failure analyses note that dependence. A clinical AI system’s developer
could similarly list the complete set of utilities (e.g., ongoing access to users’
de-identified datasets, on which the AI system’s development and validation are
based, plus the user’s production system and its data on which the AI’s runtime
operation depends) that might affect a specific node’s operation, and assess and
manage each of them.

Clinical AI Systems’ Prediction/Classification
Effectiveness- and Utility-Related Performance
The accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity of clinicians’ judgment and of
traditional diagnostics are measures against which clinical AI systems’ statistical
performance must compare favorably. FDA has, for many years, set forth guidance
on procedures for assessing noninferiority and superiority of new medical
products (FDA, 2016a; Newcombe, 1998a,b). For many applications, the so-called
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Number Needed to Treat (NNT) and Number Needed to Harm (NNH) are
useful measures of population-level clinical utility of a therapeutic or a diagnostic
(Cook and Sackett, 1995; Laupacis et al., 1988). A product (i.e., medication or
medical device) or a health service (i.e., clinical intervention, procedure, or care
process) that has a very high NNT value (>100) or that has a very low NNH
value (<10) is unlikely to meet clinicians’ or consumers’ expectations of probable
clinical benefit and improbable clinical harm.
The international CONsolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT,
2010) and STARD (Standards for Reporting of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies;
Bossuyt et al., 2003) initiatives pertain to the verification of diagnostic accuracy
conforming to existing good clinical practice rules and guidelines (Steyerberg,
2010). While these initiatives are not focused on studies that aim to demonstrate
diagnostic device equivalence, many of the reporting concepts involved are
nonetheless relevant and applicable to clinical AI. The CONSORT guidelines
aim to improve the reporting of randomized controlled trials, enabling reviewers
to understand their design, conduct, analysis, and interpretation, and to assess the
validity of their results (CONSORT, 2010). However, CONSORT is also applicable
to observational, nonrandomized studies and AI derived from machine learning.
According to a 2007 FDA guidance document,
FDA recognizes two major categories of benchmarks for assessing diagnostic
performance of new qualitative [classificatory or binomial/multinomial predictive]
diagnostic tests.These categories are (1) comparison to a reference standard (defined
below), or (2) comparison to a method or predicate other than a reference standard
(non-reference standard).
. . . The diagnostic accuracy of a new test refers to the extent of agreement
between the outcome of the new test and the reference standard. We use the
term reference standard as defined in STARD. That is, a reference standard is
“considered to be the best available method for establishing the presence or
absence of the target condition.” It divides the intended use population into only
two groups (condition present or absent) and does not consider the outcome of
the new test under evaluation.
The reference standard can be a single test or method, or a combination of
methods and techniques, including clinical follow-up [by appropriately
credentialed clinician experts]. If a reference standard is a combination of
methods, the algorithm specifying how the different results are combined to
make a final positive/negative classification (which may include the choice and
ordering of these methods) is part of the standard. (FDA, 2007b)
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In addition to the area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUROC)
curve, it is also important to evaluate the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive
value (PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV) as part of regulatory assessment
of clinical machine learning predictive models and AI. These additional
statistical performance metrics take the prevalence of the predicted outcome
into account (unlike the AUROC curve, which is independent of prevalence
[Cook, 2008]), and therefore have greater clinical relevance. Past studies have
shown that PPV and the AUROC curve have minimal correlation for risk
prediction models (Goldstein et al., 2017). Conventional statistical measures of
accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, PPV, NPV, AUROC and partial AUROC, and
so forth are, and will remain, the principal guides for regulatory clearance and
enforcement.
Analytical validation involves “establishing that the performance characteristics
of a test, tool, or instrument are acceptable” (Scheerens et al., 2017); the relevant
performance characteristics are described in Chapter 5 and are important for
regulatory oversight as well as internal analytical validation. These characteristics
validate the AI’s technical performance, but not its usefulness or clinical value.
Beyond conventional statistical metrics for diagnostic medical devices and
regulatory agencies’ de facto norms for these, the objectives of clinical validation
testing of an AI tool are to quantitatively evaluate a variety of practical questions:
• How did the AI algorithm outputs inform or obfuscate clinical decision
support recommendations?
•		How often were AI system recommendations reasonable compared to local
licensed peer clinicians addressing similar situations, according to expert
clinicians?
•		How often did attending clinicians or other staff accept the AI tool’s
recommendations, and how often did they override or interdict the action or
recommendation of the AI tool?
•		How often were the AI tool’s recommendations or actions unsafe or
inefficacious, how often did they lead to errors or harm, and are the AIassociated rates of harm or nonbenefit unacceptably worse (i.e., statistically
and clinically inferior) to what competent humans’ results are?
Furthermore, clinical utility is an inherent consideration for clinical AIs, as
described in Chapter 6.“The conclusion [is] that a given use of a medical product
will lead to a net improvement in health outcome or provide useful information
about diagnosis, treatment, management, or prevention of a disease. Clinical utility
includes the range of possible benefits or risks to individuals and populations”
(FDA-NIH Biomarker Working Group, 2016).
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Chapter 5 describes bias in sensitivity and specificity estimates in some detail.
According to FDA,
sensitivity and specificity estimates (and other estimates of diagnostic
performance) can be subject to bias. Biased estimates are systematically too high
or too low. Biased sensitivity and specificity estimates will not equal the true
sensitivity and specificity, on average. Often the existence, size (magnitude), and
direction of the bias cannot be determined. Bias creates inaccurate estimates.
[Regulatory agencies hold that] it is important to understand the potential
sources of bias to avoid or minimize them [Pepe, 2003]. Simply increasing
the overall number of subjects in the study will do nothing to reduce bias.
Alternatively, selecting the “right” subjects, changing study conduct, or data
analysis procedures may remove or reduce bias. (FDA, 2007b)

These steps are essential to eliminate validation leakage and help to estimate
the stability of the model over time.
Two main biases are important to consider: representational bias and information
bias (Althubaiti, 2016). Representational bias refers to which individuals or data
sources are represented in the data and which are not. Information bias is meant
to represent collectively “all the human biases that distort the data on which a
decision maker [relies] and that account for the validity of data [that is, the extent
these represent what they are supposed to represent accurately]” (Cabitza et al.,
2018). These two biases and the related phenomenon of information variability
together can degrade the accuracy of the data and, consequently, the accuracy of
the clinical AI model derived from them.

Real-World Evidence, Postmarket Sur veillance, and
Measurement of Clinical AI Systems’ Functional Performance
As regulators consider how to set the appropriate balance between regulatory
oversight and access to new AI technology, some options include shifting the
level of premarket review versus postmarket surveillance for safety and efficacy.
Enhanced postmarket surveillance presents an attractive possibility to allow
more streamlined premarket review process for AI technology and reflects the
likelihood of more frequent product changes over time (FDA, 2019b). Given
suitable streams of RWE, clinical AI systems are likely to learn on the fly from an
ongoing data stream because population characteristics and underlying models
can change. This requires the availability of high-quality labeled RWE as well
as continuous oversight via postmarket surveillance, because unlike for a more
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traditional FDA-approved medical device, many clinical AI systems will change
over time with the addition of new data (FDA, 2019b), though for some models
and developers the cost of adaptation may exceed the benefits. Especially for
lower risk software, allowing market access on the basis of less substantial data on
safety and efficacy and then monitoring carefully as the software is deployed in
clinical practice may lead to smoother oversight that is still robust. However, prior
efforts to rely on increased postmarket surveillance have encountered difficulty in
developer compliance and agency enforcement (Woloshin et al., 2017), although
the extent of this difficulty is contested (Kashoki et al., 2017).
As part of its Digital Health Innovation Action Plan, FDA is developing the
Pre-Cert Program, in which certain developers can apply to be precertified based
on a “robust culture of quality and organizational excellence” and commitment to
monitoring real-world performance (FDA, 2019c). In the program as envisioned,
precertified companies will be able to market lower risk SaMD without premarket
review and will receive a streamlined premarket review for higher risk SaMD.
FDA will work with developers to collect and interpret real-world information
to ensure that the software remains safe and effective in the course of real-world
use (FDA, 2019c), including the potential for updates and changes without further
review (FDA, 2019b).

Companion Diagnostic Versus Complementar y
Diagnostic Clinical AIs
Diagnostics that inform the use of drugs, biologics, or therapeutic devices
come in several regulatory forms. A companion diagnostic is sometimes required
for drug/biologic/device approval (FDA, 2016b); the in vitro diagnostic device
(IVD) and the associated therapeutic (i.e., drug, biologic, or other intervention)
must be cross-labeled, and the IVD is thereafter used as a “gating” criterion for
prescribing the therapeutic product. A complementary diagnostic, in contrast,
merely provides additional information relevant to, or supplementary to and
corroborative of, decisions guiding care of the patient in regard to the associated
therapeutic product. Complementary diagnostics are not required for FDA
approval of the associated therapeutic product, and need not be cross labeled.
Finally, a combination product is a product composed of two or more regulated
components produced and marketed as a single entity (21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e)). It is
likely that many clinical AI systems whose hazard analyses indicate that they have
medium or high risk could be successfully regulated as complementary diagnostic
medical devices.
Two additional types of diagnostics are not regulated as commercially marketed
products. An LDT is a type of IVD that is designed, manufactured, and used
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within a single health services facility for the care of patients for whom named
clinicians in that facility have responsibility. Diagnostic tests that are not marketed
commercially beyond the therapeutics development process, clinical trials, and
regulatory marketing approval are generally referred to by FDA and others as
development tools. Such tests are established and overseen similarly to other
development tools such as biomarkers.

Liability Under State Tort Law
State tort law also provides a source of risk and of regulatory pressure for the
developers and users of clinical AI systems, as well as other AI systems that could
cause injury but that are not the focus of this section. Briefly, state tort law may make
the developers or users of clinical AI systems liable when patients are injured as a
result of using those systems. Such liability could come in the form of malpractice
liability—that is, potential lawsuits against health providers, hospitals or other health
care systems, and AI system developers for performing below the standard of care
(Froomkin et al., 2019). Developers could also face product liability for defects in
the design or manufacturing of AI systems or for failure to adequately warn users
of the risks of a particular AI system. By imposing liability for injuries caused by AI
systems when those injuries could have reasonably been avoided, whether by more
careful development or more careful use, tort law exerts pressure on developers.
How exactly tort law will deal with clinical AI systems remains uncertain, because
court decisions are retrospective and the technology is nascent.Tort law is principally
grounded in state law, and its contours are shaped by courts on a case-by-case basis.
This area will continue to develop. Three factors influencing tort liability are of
particular note: the interaction of FDA approval and tort liability, liability insurance,
and the impact of transparency on tort liability. To be clear, this area of law is still
very much developing, and this section only sketches some of the ways different
aspects of health care AI systems may interact with the system of tort liability.

Interaction of FDA Approval and Tort Liability
Different regulatory pathways influence the availability of state tort lawsuits
against AI developers and, indirectly, the ability of state tort law (and liability
insurers reacting to that law) to create independent incentives for the safe
and effective development of clinical AI systems. In general, states may not
establish statutory requirements that are “different from, or in addition to” FDA
requirements regulating devices (21 U.S.C. § 360k). The U.S. Supreme Court has
also held that this preempts certain state tort lawsuits alleging negligent design
or manufacturing. For devices, including clinical AI apps, that undergo a full
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premarket approval, state tort lawsuits are generally preempted under the Supreme
Court’s holding in Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008). Nevertheless, this
preemption will not apply to most AI apps, which are likely to be cleared through
the 510(k) clearance pathway rather than premarket approval. Clearance under the
510(k) pathway will generally not preempt state tort lawsuits under the reasoning
of Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), because rather than directly determining
safety and efficacy, FDA finds the new app to be equivalent to an already approved
product. It is unclear what preemptive effect De Novo classification will have on
preempting state tort lawsuits, because the Supreme Court emphasized both the
thoroughness of premarket review and its determination that the device is safe
and effective, rather than equivalent to an approved predicate device.
State tort lawsuits alleging violations of industry-wide requirements, such
as CGMP or other validation requirements, are a contestable source of state
tort liability. Some courts have found that lawsuits alleging violations of state
requirements that parallel industry-wide requirements are preempted by federal
law and that such violations may only be addressed by FDA. Other courts disagree,
and the matter is currently unsettled (Tarloff, 2011). In at least some jurisdictions,
if app developers violate FDA-imposed requirements, courts may find parallel
duties under state law and developers may be held liable. Nevertheless, if app
developers comply with all FDA-imposed industry-wide requirements, states
cannot impose additional requirements.

Liability Insurance
The possibility of liability creates another avenue for regulation through the
intermediary of insurance. Developers, providers, and health systems are all likely
to carry liability insurance to decrease the risk of a catastrophic tort judgment
arising from potential injury. Liability insurers set rules and requirements regarding
what information must be provided or what practices and procedures must be
followed in order to issue a policy. Although insurers are often not considered
regulators, they can exert substantial, if less visible, pressure that may shape the
development and use of clinical AI systems (Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2012).

Impact of Transparency on Tort Liability
Transparency and opacity also interact with tort liability. Determining causation
can already be difficult in medical tort litigation, because injuries may result
from a string of different actions and it is not always obvious which action or
combination of actions caused the injury. Opacity in clinical AI systems may
further complicate the ability of injured patients, lawyers, or providers or health
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systems to determine precisely what caused the injury. Explainable algorithms may
make it easier to assess tort liability, as could transparency around data provenance,
training and validation methods, and ongoing oversight. Perversely, this could
create incentives for developers to avoid certain forms of transparency as a way
to lessen the likelihood of downstream tort liability. On the other hand, courts—
or legislatures—could mandate that due care, in either the development or use
of clinical AI tools, requires some form of transparency. To take a hypothetical
example, a court might one day hold that when a provider relies on an algorithmic
diagnosis, that provider can only exercise due care by assessing how the algorithm
was validated. Developers or other intermediaries would then need to provide
sufficient information to allow that assessment.

PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND DATA
Regulation regarding patient privacy and data sharing is also highly relevant
to AI development, implementation, and use, whether clinical AI or AI used for
other health care purposes (“health care AI”). The United States lacks a general
data privacy regime, but HIPAA includes a Privacy Rule that limits the use and
disclosure of protected health information (PHI)—essentially any individually
identifiable medical information—by covered entities (i.e., almost all providers,
health insurers, and health data clearinghouses) and their business associates
where the business relationship involves PHI (45 C.F.R. § 160.103). Covered
entities and business associates may only use or disclose information with patient
authorization, if the entity receives a waiver from an institutional review board or
privacy board, or for one of several exceptions (45 C.F.R. § 164.502).These listed
exceptions include the use and disclosure of PHI for the purposes of payment,
public health, law enforcement, or health care operations, including quality
improvement efforts but not including research aimed at creating generalizable
knowledge (45 C.F.R. § 164.501). For health systems that intend to use their own
internal data to develop in-house AI tools (e.g., to predict readmission rates or the
likelihood of complications among their own patients), the quality improvement
exception will likely apply. Even when the use or disclosure of information is
permitted under HIPAA, the Privacy Rule requires that covered entities take
reasonable steps to limit the use or disclosure to the minimum necessary to
accomplish the intended purpose. While HIPAA does create protections for
patient data, its reach is limited, and health information can come from many
sources that HIPAA does not regulate (Price and Cohen, 2019).
A complex set of other laws may also create requirements to protect patient
data. HIPAA sets a floor for data privacy, not a ceiling. State laws may be more
restrictive; for instance, some states provide stronger protections for especially
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sensitive information such as HIV status or substance abuse information (e.g.,
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2783). California’s Consumer Protection Act creates
general protections for consumer information, including health data. And although
the European Union’s GDPR focuses on actions that directly affect the European
Union, it also places limits on the processing of data about EU residents, regardless
of where the EU citizen resides globally, and may therefore affect the privacy
practices of non-EU entities engaged in medical AI development (Marelli and
Testa, 2018). The GDPR generally requires legal and real persons to collect and
process only as much personal data as necessary, obtain such data only for a listed
legitimate purpose or with consent, notify individuals of the receipt of data, and
engage in privacy-centered policy design. Health data are especially protected under
the GDPR, and their processing is prohibited unless with explicit consent or in a
number of specified exceptions, such as for health operations or scientific research.

Privacy and Patient Consent Issues in Health Care AI
With regard to discrete clinical data, unstructured textual data, imagery data,
waveform and time-series data, and hybrid data used in clinical AI models, the
development and deployment of AI systems have complex interactions with
privacy concerns and privacy law (e.g., Loukides et al., 2010). Adequate oversight
of clinical AI systems must address the nature of potential privacy concerns
wherever they may arise, approaches to address those concerns, and management
of the potential tension between privacy and other governance concerns for
clinical AI.

Initial AI Development
Privacy concerns occur in the first instance because training health care AI
depends on assembling large collections of health data about patients (Horvitz
and Mulligan, 2015). Health data about individuals are typically considered
sensitive. Some forms of data are particularly sensitive, such as substance abuse
data or sexually transmitted disease information (Ford and Price, 2016). Other
forms of data raise privacy concerns about the particular individual, such as
genetic data that can reveal information about family members (Ram et al.,
2018). Collecting, using, and sharing patient health data raise concerns about the
privacy of the affected individuals, whether those concerns are consequentialist
(e.g., the possibility of future discrimination based on health status) or not (e.g.,
dignitary concerns about others knowing embarrassing or personal facts) (Price
and Cohen, 2019). The process of collecting and sharing may also make data
more vulnerable to interception or inadvertent access by other parties.
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External Validation
External validation of clinical AI systems creates other avenues for privacy
harms. Some proposals have called for third-party validation of medical AI
recommendations and predictions to validate algorithmic quality (Ford and Price,
2016; Price, 2017a). Such an approach would either require making patient data
available to those third parties or require the AI developer to have a partnership
with a data owner, where data scientists ensure comparable data transformation
and algorithm execution to provide external validation without direct data sharing.

Inference Generation
A third form of potential privacy harm that could arise from health care AI is
quite different and involves the generation of inferences about individual patients
based on their health data. Machine learning makes predictions based on data, and
those predictions may themselves be sensitive data, or may at least be viewed that
way by patients. In one highly publicized example of such a case,Target identified
a teenage woman’s pregnancy based on changes in her purchasing habits and then
sent her targeted coupons and advertisements, which led to her father learning
of her pregnancy from Target before his daughter had shared the news (Duhigg,
2012). The epistemic status of this information is debatable; arguments have been
made that inferences cannot themselves be privacy violations, although popular
perception may differ (Skopek, 2018).
Some standard privacy-protecting approaches of data collectors and users face
difficulties when applied to health care AI.The most privacy-protective approach
limits initial data collection to necessarily limit the potential for problematic
use or disclosure (Terry, 2017). However, this approach presumes that the data
collector knows which data are necessary and which are not, knowledge that is
often absent for health care AI.

De-Identification
De-identification, a common privacy-protecting approach, raises several
concerns. Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, patient information is not considered
PHI (and thus not subject to the rule’s restrictions on use and disclosure) if a
set of 17 listed pieces of identifying information have been removed (45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(b)(2)(i)).These listed pieces include at least some elements that may be
useful to health care AI, such as key dates, zip codes, or photographs of the patient.
Thus, de-identification can lead to the loss of relevant data.
De-identification also raises two diametrically opposed concerns about
gathering data. On the one hand, de-identification can lead to data fragmentation.
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Patient data are gathered in many different contexts, including by different
providers and different insurers. This diffuse data collection occurs both laterally,
as patients encounter different parts of the medical system at the same time, and
longitudinally, as patients shift between different medical environments over the
course of time. Identifying information provides the easiest way to reassemble
different parts of patient records into more comprehensive datasets that can help
drive at least some forms of health care AI (e.g., long-term predictions of efficacy
or mortality). When identifying information is removed from patient data,
reassembly becomes harder, especially for developers with fewer resources. On the
other hand, de-identification is not proof against re-identification (Ohm, 2010).
Re-identification can happen at the level of the individual (via targeted efforts)
or more broadly across datasets. “Data triangulation” refers to the idea that if data
gatherers can collect multiple datasets that include some overlapping information,
and if some of those datasets include identifying information, then data users
can merge those datasets and identify individuals in the otherwise de-identified
datasets (Mello and Cohen, 2018; Terry, 2017). Under current law, covered entities
are limited in how they can re-identify data, since once it is re-identified it is
again governed by HIPAA restrictions, but this does not govern those that are not
covered entities. In addition, data-sharing agreements often include provisions
prohibiting efforts at re-identification by the data recipient (Ohmann et al., 2017).
Individual consent and authorization provide the clearest possible path toward
ameliorating privacy concerns but raise their own complications.When individuals
know the purposes for which their information will be used and can give meaningful
informed consent to those uses, privacy concerns can be limited. For machine
learning and health care AI, however, future uses may be unpredictable.The revised
Common Rule does allow for the provision of broad consent for unspecified future
use (45 C.F.R. § 46.116). Nevertheless, systematic differences between those willing
to consent to future data use and those unwilling to consent—or unable to consent
because they lack that entry into the health data system—means that relying on
individual authorization can introduce bias into datasets (Spector-Bagdady, 2016).
Furthermore, the more meaningful the individual opportunity to consent, the
higher the procedural hurdles created for the assembly of data—and the greater
the likelihood of eventual bias. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology has developed a Model Privacy Notice to “help developers
convey information about their privacy and security policies” (ONC, 2018).

Data Infrastructure
The availability of data is an underlying legal and regulatory challenge for
clinical AI system development, which requires large amounts of data for training
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and validation purposes. Once particular AI systems are deployed in the real world,
RWD should be collected to ensure that the AI systems are performing well and,
ideally, to improve that performance. However, numerous hurdles exist to the
collection of sufficient data (Price, 2016).Various privacy laws, as described above,
restrict the collection of identifiable information, and de-identified information can
be difficult to assemble to capture either long-term effects or data across different
data sources. Informed consent laws, such as the Common Rule for federally
funded research or the consent requirements incorporated into the GDPR, create
additional barriers to data collection. Even where privacy or informed consent
rules do not actually prohibit the collection, use, or sharing of data, some health care
actors may limit such actions out of an abundance of caution, creating a penumbra
of data limitations. In addition, for those actors who do find ways around these
requirements, criticism and outrage may arise if patients feel they are inadequately
compensated for their valuable data. On an economic level, holders of data have
strong incentives to keep data in proprietary siloes to derive competitive advantage,
leading to more fragmentation of data from different sources. For data holders who
wish to keep data proprietary for economic reasons, referencing privacy concerns
can provide a publicly acceptable reason for these tactics.
At least four possibilities emerge for collection of data, with some evidence of
each in current practice:
1.		
Large individual data holders: Some large holders of individual data
possess enough data to train AI models on their own, such as health systems
(e.g., Partners or Ascension), health care payers (e.g., United Healthcare or
Humana), or tech/data companies (e.g., Google or Apple).
2.		Data brokers and collaboration: The collaboration or collection of data
from different sources is possible, but these endeavors often encounter the
hurdles described above, which may introduce limitations on data sources or
bias in the incorporation process.
3.		Failure to collect data: In some instances, no actor may have the incentive
or ability to collect and gather data. This may be a problem especially for
otherwise underserved populations, whose data may be under-represented in
AI development and monitoring efforts.
4.		
Government data infrastructure: Governmental agencies can collect
health data as part of an effort to support future innovation in clinical AI
(among other efforts). The Precision Medicine Initiative’s All of Us cohort
is an example of such an effort (Frey et al., 2016; NIH, 2019), as is the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Million Veteran Program (Gaziano
et al., 2016), although the latter has more restrictive policies for its data use
(Price, 2017b).
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Of the four models, the first three are the straightforward results of current
market dynamics. Each creates challenges, including smaller dataset size, potential
bias in collection, access for other developers or for validators, and, in the case
of failures to collect data, exclusion of some populations from AI development
and validation. Government data infrastructure—that is, data gathered via
government efforts for the purposes of fostering innovation, including clinical
AI—has the greatest possibility of being representative and available for a variety
of downstream AI uses but also faces potential challenges in public will for its
collection. Even when the government itself does not collect data, it can usefully
promulgate standards for data collection and consolidation (Richesson and
Krischer, 2007; Richesson and Nadkarni, 2011); the lack of standards for EHRs,
for instance, has led to persistent problems aggregating data across contexts.

Tension Between Privacy and Data Access
In general, there is tension between privacy-protecting approaches and access
to big data for the development, validation, and oversight of health care AI. For
instance, Google was sued for privacy violations in 2019 as a result of an agreement
with the University of Chicago Medical Center to use the system’s data in AI and
other big data applications (Cohen and Mello, 2019). Higher protections for patient
data, whether regarding front-end collection or back-end use, increase the hurdles
for the development of health care AI (Ford and Price, 2016). These hurdles may
also exacerbate differences in capabilities between large, sophisticated entities—
that is, health systems, health insurers, or large technology companies—and smaller
developers that may lack the resources to develop AI in a privacy-protective fashion.
However, privacy and innovation in health care AI are not in strict opposition.
Newer technological approaches such as differential privacy (Malin et al., 2013)
and dynamic consent (Kaye et al., 2014) can help enable development while still
protecting privacy. In fact, the desire to protect privacy can be its own spur to
the development of innovative technologies to collect, manage, and use health
data. Nevertheless, resolving this tension presents a substantial ongoing challenge,
one familiar in the development of a learning health system more generally. This
resolution will not be simple and is beyond the scope of this chapter; it will demand
careful policy making and continued engagement by stakeholders at various levels.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS
In summary, clinical AI tools present opportunities for improving patients’
and clinicians’ point-of-care decision making, and a viable business model is
necessary to ensure that safe, effective clinical AI systems are developed, validated,
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and sustainably deployed, implemented in EHR systems, and curated over time
to maintain adequate accuracy and reliability. However, clinical AI systems could
potentially pose risks in terms of inappropriate treatment recommendations,
privacy breaches, or other harms (Evans and Whicher, 2018), and some types of
clinical AI systems will be classified by regulatory agencies as SaMDs, subject to
premarket clearance or approval and other requirements that aim to protect the
public’s health. Other clinical AI tools may be deemed to be LDT-type services,
subject to CLIA and similar regulations.Whatever agency is involved in oversight,
compliance with regulations should be mandatory rather than voluntary, given the
potential for problematic incentives for system developers (Evans and Whicher,
2018). As the law and policy of health care AI systems develop over time, it is
both expected and essential that multiple stakeholders—including payers, patients
and families, policy makers, diagnostic manufacturers and providers, clinicians,
academics, and others—remain involved in helping determine how best to ensure
that such systems advance the quintuple aim and improve the health care system
more generally.
• The black box nature of a clinical AI system should not disqualify a system from
regulatory approval or use, but transparency, where possible, can aid in oversight
and adoption and should be encouraged or potentially required. AI systems,
including black box systems, should be capable of providing the users with an
opportunity to examine quantitative evidence that the recommendation in
the current situation is indeed the best recent historical choice, supplying deidentified, aggregated data sufficient for the user to satisfy the user’s interest in
confirming that this is so, or is at least no worse and no more uncertain than
decisions the user would take independently were the AI not involved.
•		 When possible, machine learning–based predictive models should be evaluated
in an independent dataset (i.e., external validation) before they are adopted in
the clinical practice. Risk assessment to determine the degree to which datasetspecific biases affect the model should be undertaken. Regulatory agencies
should recommend specific statistical methods for evaluating and mitigating
bias.
•		To the extent that machine learning–based models continuously learn from
new data, regulators should adopt postmarket surveillance mechanisms to
ensure continuing (and ideally improving) high-quality performance.
•		Regulators should engage in collaborative governance efforts with other
stakeholders and experts throughout the health system, including data scientists,
clinicians, ethicists, and others, to continuously evaluate deployed clinical AI
for effectiveness and safety on the basis of RWD.
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•		 Government actors should invest in infrastructure that enables equitable, highquality data collection, such as technical standards and technological capability
building.
•		Government actors should continue and increase efforts to develop large,
high-quality, voluntary health datasets for clinical AI development (among
other purposes), such as the All of Us cohort within the Precision Medicine
Initiative, while ensuring adequate measures to address patient notice and
potential harms.
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